1 THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBART 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 MARK A. ARTHUR, CIRILO MARTINEZ, **CLASS ACTION** 10 PARI NAJAFI, and HEATHER MCCUE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly NO. 10-cy-00198-JLR 11 situated, PROPOSED | ORDER APPROVING 12 CLASS COUNSELS' MOTION FOR Plaintiffs, AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 13 AND COSTS AND SERVICE  $\mathbf{v}$ . AWARDS IN CONNECTION WITH 14 SALLIE MAE, INC., AMENDED SETTLEMENT 15 Defendant. 16 JUDITH HARPER, 17 Plaintiff/Intervenor, 18 19 ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendant. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Class Counsel's Motion For Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Service Awards in Connection With Amended Settlement ("Fee Motion") came before the Court for hearing on September 14, 2012, pursuant to this Court's April 2 & 3, 2012 Orders granting preliminary approval to the proposed Amended Settlement. *See* Dkt. Nos. 215, 216. The Court has read and considered the Fee Motion, all supporting declarations and all other materials relating to the Fee Motion.

## I. THE REQUESTED AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE PERCENTAGE-OF-THE-FUND METHOD

"Attorneys' fees provisions included in proposed class action settlement agreements are, like every other aspect of such agreements, subject to the determination whether the settlement is 'fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable." *Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9th Cir 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). Courts have the discretion to choose either the "lodestar/multiplier" method or the "percentage" method to determine a reasonable attorneys' fee. *Hanlon v. Chrysler Group*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998). "[U]se of the percentage method in common fund cases appears to be dominant." *In re Omnivision Techs, Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008). By contrast, courts rely on the lodestar method under circumstances not applicable here, *i.e.*, when "there is no way to gauge the net value of the settlement or of any percentage thereof." *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1029. As this is a common fund case, the Court will evaluate Class Counsel's fee application pursuant to the percentage-of-the-fund method.

The benchmark for an attorneys' fee award in the Ninth Circuit is twenty-five percent of the common fund. *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2002); *Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993). Factors that federal courts in the Ninth Circuit use to determine the reasonableness of fees under the percentage-of-the-fund approach include: (1) the results achieved (including results beyond the benefits of a cash fund);

(2) the risk involved with the litigation; (3) the contingent nature of the fee; and (4) awards made in similar cases. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1048.

The Court has considered these factors and determines that the requested award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses of \$4,830,000.00—20 percent of the common fund—is appropriate. First, the Amended Settlement provides meaningful equitable and monetary relief—the largest TCPA settlement of which Class Counsel and the Court are aware—and it reflects the diligent work of skilled and experienced Class Counsel. Second, the risks involved in this litigation were notable given the evolving state of the law impacting Plaintiffs' TCPA claims and Sallie Mae's numerous potential affirmative defenses. Furthermore, by agreeing to litigate this case on a contingency basis, Class Counsel risked their own resources with no guarantee of recovery. Finally, the percentage fee requested is consistent with or lower than the fees and costs awarded in cases involving similar TCPA claims and/or similarly sized class settlements.

# II. CLASS COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS IS REASONABLE

The Court further finds that Class Counsel's request for reimbursement of costs is also reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that Class Counsel do not seek costs in addition to the \$4.83 million requested fee. The Ninth Circuit allows recovery of pre-settlement litigation costs in the context of class action settlement. *Staton*, 327 F.3d at 974; *In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig.*, 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Reimbursement of reasonable costs is fully in keeping with applicable law. Throughout the course of this litigation, Class Counsel incurred out-of-pocket costs totaling \$134,114.61. Based on a review of Class Counsel's expense reports, the Court is satisfied that the requested costs are relevant to the litigation and reasonable in amount.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Selbin Decl. ¶¶ 65-66, Ex. C; Terrell Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. B; Wilson Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. C; Swigart Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B; Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 8.

### III. SERVICE AWARDS FOR THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS ARE APPROPRIATE

Plaintiffs request combined service payments of \$7,500.00, consisting of \$2,500.00 payments to the Mark Arthur, Cirilo Martinez, and Pari Najafi. The trial court has discretion to order service awards to be paid to class representatives. *In re Mego Fin'l Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir. 2000); *Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (W.D. Wash. 2009). Here, the record indicates that Plaintiffs Arthur, Martinez, and Najafi contributed to the litigation by: (1) assisting counsel with the preparation of the complaints and amended complaints; (2) producing relevant documents and responding to other informal written discovery; (3) staying abreast of the multiple rounds of settlement negotiations; (4) reviewing the (original and amended) settlement terms; and (5) preparing and submitting declarations to the Court.<sup>2</sup> The Court finds these contributions to the litigation and settlement process sufficient to warrant the requested Service Awards. When compared to service awards in other cases, the \$2,500 payments requested here are justified.<sup>3</sup>

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The Court having considered all papers filed and proceedings had herein, and otherwise being fully informed, and good cause appearing therefore,

#### IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

1. This Court hereby finds and concludes that due and adequate notice has been directed to all persons and entities who are Class Members as required in this Court's April 3, 2012 (Dkt. No. 216), advising them of Class Counsel's intent to seek attorneys' fees and costs and Service Awards, and of their right to object thereto.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Declarations of Mark Arthur, Cirilo Martinez, and Pari Najafi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Pelletz, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30 & n.9 (approving \$7,500 service awards and collecting decisions approving awards ranging from \$5,000 to \$40,000); Grays Harbor Adventist Christian Sch. v. Carrier Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106515, at \*16 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2008) (approving \$3,500 awards).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See generally Declaration of Jennifer Keough.

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1	7. Without affecting the finality of this Order, the Court reserves continuing and
2	exclusive jurisdiction over parties to the Amended Settlement Agreement to settle any disputes
3	related to the allocation of the costs and fees awarded by this Order.
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5	IT IS SO ORDERED.
6	Dated: September 17, 2012  The Honorable James L. Robart
7	United States District Judge
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